In this paper we examine empirically the relationship between banks' business model and bank performance. Using detailed information on the US banking sector over the period 2002-2012, we investigate whether or not banks' higher involvement in non-traditional banking businesses and activity diversification has been associated with higher returns and risks. Over the long-term, we find robust evidence that commercial bank expansion into non-traditional activities has lacked revenue and diversification benefits: overall risks increase across banks, while returns do not. A higher degree of diversification into traditional and certain non-traditional activities, on the contrary, has been associated with important risk-reduction benefits. The different risk-return effects are non-linear and differ across particular activities, suggesting that there exists an optimal mix of bank activities.
Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis, a number of bank regulators from the advanced economies have implemented or are considering significant modifications in their regulatory framework. The adjustments range from enhancements in capital adequacy (Brei and Gambacorta, 2014) and liquidity requirements (Bech and Keister, 2013) to the mandatory stress-testing of systemically important financial institutions (Bernanke, 2013) . Another major shift in banking regulation -albeit much less synchronized across jurisdictions -represents the so-called structural bank reform aimed at reviewing and eventually limiting the permissible scope of activities in which commercial banks are allowed to operate (Gambacorta and van Rixtel, 2013) .
The last decades have been marked by important financial innovation and bank deregulation. There was a broad consensus among policymakers that banks should be allowed to offer the full scope of financial services -ranging from traditional bank activities to investment banking or market-making activities. The main argument of the proponents of this line of thought was that the diversification of banking activities which goes along with the universal bank model will ultimately enhance banks' economies of scope through revenue and cost synergies (Calomiris, 2000) . It was also believed that banks would benefit from risk reductions associated with activity diversification (Wall and Eisenbeis, 1984) . Accordingly, universal banks that offer the full scope of financial services should be favoured to narrow banks which would have little economies of scope and less diversified fields of activities.
The conventional wisdom, however, has been questioned with the onset of the global financial crisis. A number of the major banks have been pushed close to their insolvency caused by a combination of significant increases in asset write-downs -originating in both banks' loan and trading books -and the freeze of funding markets. It has been argued that the most vulnerable commercial banks have been those that shifted too many resources away from the traditional banking business into highly complex and hardly understood trading portfolios. In an attempt to insulate depositors and borrowers from such types of financial risks, a number of governments have started to re-consider their existing models of structural bank regulation putting forth the possibility of a mandatory separation of "commercial banking" from certain "investment banking" activities (Gambacorta and van Rixtel, 2013) .
The empirical literature on the relationship between activity diversification, bank profitability and bank risk has produced mixed evidence. Activity diversification might arguably be associated with improvements in bank profitability, as banks find new ways to increase their earning capacity or achieve revenue and costs synergies linked to the involvement in different types of activities (Yasuda, 2005) . A more diversified field of activities, however, might not translate into lower risks, especially if returns are positively correlated, or if the non-traditional financial activities are not well undertaken by banks due to a lack of expertise. Mixing loan portfolios with trading portfolios and types of other activities might just as well increase the opaqueness of banks, distort their incentives and build the ground for risk-shifting (Kahn and Winton, 2004; Boot and Ratnovski, 2012) . Indeed, there exists evidence that diversification benefits can be offset by the strong volatility of income generated by non-interest activities (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; DeYoung and Torna, 2013) .
Against these backdrops, the present study investigates whether or not the universal bank model has been associated with higher risks and returns, using information on the financial statements of close to 10,000 commercial banks headquartered in the United States. The data are on a quarterly frequency covering the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . In particular we seek to answer the following questions: (i) Do universal banks that offer a broader range of financial services outperform more concentrated, narrow banks?; and (ii) If there are any differences in the performance of universal and narrow banks, which are the activities that explain this divergence?
Our analysis has to overcome some important challenges. First, we have to take into account that commercial banks in the United States are in many cases owned by bank holding companies, which themselves might control other commercial banks. The financial statements have thus to be aggregated according to the ultimate financial holder. Second, holding companies might own nonfinancial firms that are not covered in the call reports of commercial banks. This implies that we have to augment our data with the financial statements of bank holding companies. And finally, we have to take into account the large number of mergers and acquisitions that occurred during our sample period, as these events are associated with changes in ownerships and business strategies.
The econometric analysis builds on the empirical work of Stiroh and Rumble (2006) . Using information on US financial holding companies, the authors provide evidence that diversification benefits exist between different types of bank activities, however, these gains have to be put into relation with the increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are much more volatile and not necessarily more profitable than interest-generating activities. We extend their approach in at least three important ways. First, we distinguish between traditional and non-traditional types of non-interest income, rather than considering the two as a homogenous group (DeYoung and Torna, 2013) . Second, we allow for a non-linear relationship between bank performance and banks' business strategy (Gambacorta and van Rixtel, 2013) . And finally, we employ more recent data over a longer time horizon which allows us to compare and contrast our results to those of Stiroh and Rumble (2006) over the period 1997-2002. Our main results confirm that banks face a trade-off between the risk-return effects associated with different business strategies. In terms of banks' expansion into non-traditional banking activities over the long-run, we find a rather sobering result for the US banking industry: the expansion into the nontraditional spheres of banking has been associated with significant increases in risks across banks which have not been compensated by higher returns. Within banks from a short-term perspective, overall risks still increase with higher non-traditional activities. However, higher returns compensate banks partially for the increase in income volatility. There exist, on the other hand, important riskreduction benefits associated with the diversification of banking activities into traditional and particular types of non-traditional businesses for the long-and short-term. Bank returns on the other hand are not significantly affected by the degree of diversification. Moreover, our results suggest that not all non-traditional activities had negative effects on bank risks. For instance, banks' expansion into the underwriting and sale of insurance is associated with significant improvements in both bank profits and risks. Our results therefore suggest that there exists an optimal mix of financial activities in which banks should be allowed to operate.
The results cast some doubt on the question of why commercial banks have been moving into particular non-traditional activities (Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; DeYoung and Torna, 2013) .
One explanation could be that bank managers have overestimated the benefits of certain activities and underestimated the inherent risks. More specifically, it could be that bank managers have underestimated the conditional correlations of the less traditional revenues with those generated by traditional activities which eventually reached high levels during the recent financial turmoil.
Alternatively, it could be that bank managers have targeted expected short-term profits and risks rather than the long-term implications associated with inappropriate compensation schemes or other types of agency problems and imperfections in the banking industry.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss briefly the data and some stylized facts on the universal bank model. Section 3 presents the econometric approach and discusses the main hypothesis and the econometric results. Section 4 presents the robustness checks and Section 5 provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the optimal mix of bank activities. The final section concludes.
Description of the data
The data on the financial statements of FDIC-insured banks and bank holding companies, such as the information on mergers and acquisitions, are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The financial accounts of banks are reported on a consolidated basis meaning that any majority-owned subsidiary is integrated in the financial statement of the controlling bank. In the US banking industry, however, it is relatively common that -on top -different commercial banks are controlled by a bank or financial holding company. In the context of universal banks, which often operate and manage a variety of business lines through separate subsidiary banks, it is thus essential to aggregate the financial statements of banks by the ultimate holding company. In doing so, we make sure to capture the entire business activities of large and complex banking groups taking into account the interrelated structure of ownership. The aggregation by ultimate holding companies is also a natural choice in our context, since bank managers presumably make decisions on the entire institution.
More specifically, the available information allows us to identify whether a bank is owned by a bank holding company, or whether it operates on a stand-alone basis. It is hereby relatively common that a holding company controls more than one subsidiary bank. For example, the holding company Citigroup INC controls the two national banks Citibank NA (60% of the BHC's consolidated assets) and Citibank South Dakota NA (10%), the Edge Corporation Citibank Overseas Investment Corporation (22%), and two small non-deposit trust companies. In what follows, we will thus focus on the "aggregated", pro-forma financial statements, when banks are controlled by the same holding company, while we use the original financial accounts if banks operate on a stand-alone basis. As a final precaution, we treat a banking group as a new institution when there is a change in the ownership, because such changes are likely to be associated with structural reorganizations and shifts in business strategies (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006) . In our database, there are recorded 14,793 FDIC-insured banks (mainly commercial and state-charted saving banks) over the period 1995-2012, of which 7,429 entities have been active at end-2012 with $14.5 trillion of assets. The majority of these banks (79% of the total) have been controlled by 7,172 holding companies. In other words, the average banking group consisted of one holding company and two FDIC-insured banks (Wells Fargo controlled with 172 most entities). After excluding banks with a short lifespan and accounting for changes in the ownership, we ended up with 10,585 distinct banking groups (stand-alone and pro-forma) of which 5,785 entities have been active at end-2012 with a total of $13.6 trillion of assets.
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Universal banks are characterized by a higher degree of activity diversification compared to more concentrated banks. This difference becomes apparent in a bank's income sources: while commercial banks traditionally earned profits from the intermediation of deposits and loans, as summarized by the net interest income share, universal banks generate higher non-interest income shares associated with 2 We excluded banks with a lifespan of less than 12 quarters. Due to the large number of changes in the ultimate holding company, we required in addition that the aggregated pro-forma bank has been active for at least 12 quarters. We hereby modified the date of the change in the ownership if the information provided in the call reports differed from the M&A database. Finally, foreign-owned banks have been excluded. non-traditional activities. These include revenues from market operations or fees generated by trading, securitization, investment banking, insurance underwriting and sale, or securities brokerage. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the non-interest income share in commercial banking in the United States has gradually increased in the period 1995-2007 from 33 to 42 percent of net operating income. This general trend has, however, largely reversed with the onset of the financial crisis and regulatory pressures. The universal bank model has been much more common in Europe compared to the United States (Calomiris, 1995) . Indeed -since the Great Depression -there has been for decades a strict separation of commercial banking from investment banking and other non-bank activities. Only over time, certain activity restrictions have been removed starting in the late 1980s and culminating in the GrammLeach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999, which allowed banks to engage in securities dealing and underwriting, insurance, merchant banking and propriety trading on a bank's own account (Furlong, 2000; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Avraham et al., 2012) .
The adoption of the new, non-traditional activities has been uneven across banks. While investment banking and securities brokerage complemented naturally the product lines of the major banking groups, the underwriting and sale of insurance proved a profitable business strategy for most banks independent of bank size and clientele. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the sources of non-interest income across large and small banks differ remarkably: while traditional activities (fiduciary income, fees related to payment and deposit account services) accounted for the major part of non-interest income in the case of small banks, non-traditional activities (investment banking, brokerage and investment banking) have been much more important in the case of large banks. 3 In percent of net operating income (net interest income plus non-interest income). Non-interest income from non-traditional activities (information available from Q2/2001 onwards) includes revenues from market operations and fees generated by trading, securitization, investment banking, insurance underwriting and sale, venture capital, and servicing of real estate mortgages, credit cards, and other financial assets held by clients. The "other non-interest income" category (discussed in Section 4) is included in the non-traditional part. 
,
where OR it denotes operating income of bank i at time t and I it j the income earned from activity j.
Operating income is defined by the sum of the different interest income sources, which include interest income on loans, leases, balances due from depository institutions, trading assets, securities and a residual category, and the different non-interest income sources related to fiduciary services, 4 In percent of total non-interest income. Large banks refer to the 10 largest banks in terms of assets in 2007, while small banks are those with total assets below the 10 th percentile of the distribution. "Other income" represents the category other non-interest income (mainly income from intercompany/affiliates, interchange, merchant processing, and operating lease for large banks). For sake of presentation, we added small incomes to this category (venture capital and annuity sales for large banks; venture capital, securitization and trading for small banks). 5 We have as well experimented with asset diversification, but prefer this measure since Fee-for-Service activities are not readily displayed in the balance sheet. There are, however, some caveats in using income diversification, since an unsuccessful, universal bank which has gained income in only one category and zero in the others would be classified as a narrow bank. In our cross-sectional analysis, however, in which we use averages over banks' lifetime this type of measurement error should be small. payment & deposit account services, trading, securitization, loan servicing, venture capital and other non-interest income.
(ii) Non-traditional vs traditional banks -measured by the ratio of non-traditional, noninterest income (total non-interest income net of fees related to fiduciary and payment & deposit account services) in total operating income (the sum of total interest income and total non-interest income).
(iii) Bank holdings with non-bank subsidiaries ("BHC-owned banks") vs other banksdefined by banking groups that are controlled by a bank holding company which itself controls as well non-bank (broker, dealer or insurance) subsidiaries. Table 1 provides some first summary statistics across the different types of banks. A few patterns emerge. On average, banks with a higher share of non-traditional income, higher degree of income diversification, and banks owned by bank holding companies with non-bank subsidiaries have been much larger in terms of assets than banks with the opposed characteristics. While non-traditional banks had -by definition -a much higher non-interest income share (1.9 percent of assets prior to the crisis) compared to traditional banks (0.5 percent), the difference is less important if one compares diversified with more concentrated banks (with shares of 1.2 and 0.9 percent, respectively). The highest non-interest income shares have been recorded by BHC-owned banks (2.2 percent) indicating that there is a certain overlap with the definition of non-traditional banks. As a group, non-traditional, diversified and BHC-owned banks have been slightly more profitable compared to the other banks prior to the crisis. With the onset of the financial turmoil, bank profitability dropped across all groups mainly explained by reductions in interest income and increases in provisions and non-interest expenses.
On the asset side, the largest differences can be observed at banks with a high degree of income diversification. More precisely, these banks had with 46 percent of assets a much higher share of liquid assets (mainly investments into securities) prior to the crisis than the other banks with a liquid assets ratio of close to 30 percent. As a consequence, diversified banks have been much less involved in the lending business with a share of 50 percent of assets compared to an average of 64 percent. There are, however, important differences in the composition of loans across the other groups of banks. For instance, non-traditional banks and those owned by bank holding companies with non-bank subsidiaries have been much more exposed to the risky commercial and industrial loan business with shares of close to 10 percent of assets compared to 2 percent for the average bank. Finally, BHCowned banks had the highest trading asset ratios with 2 percent of assets compared to 0.05 percent for the average bank.
On the liability side, the differences are much less important. All groups of banks have mainly been financed by costumer deposits. The lowest shares have been observed at BHC-owned banks which recorded a deposit ratio of 71 percent of assets prior to the crisis compared to 83 percent for the average bank. It appears that BHC-owned banks have been funded to a larger extent by inter-bank liabilities and wholesale funding, making them more vulnerable to a freeze in these market segments.
In terms of capitalization -as measured by equity over total assets -banks are comparable with an average ratio of close to 11 percent indicating that most banks had a leverage ratio well above the regulatory minimum of 4 percent. There are however significant differences in the regulatory riskweighted capital ratios. Traditional banks, more concentrated banks, and those not owned by a bank holding company with non-bank subsidiaries had on average higher risk-weighted capital buffers than banks on the other side of the spectrum.
There are huge differences in the off-balance sheet exposures across BHC-owned banks and the other banks. For instance, on average credit commitments amounted to 42 percent of assets prior to the crisis compared to an average of 14 percent in the entire banking industry, making BHC-owned banks vulnerable to unexpected drawings from the part of liquidity-constrained bank borrowers during the financial turmoil. Similar to this, non-traditional banks recorded with 27 percent of assets a much higher ratio of credit commitments than the average of the banking industry. An even more striking difference can be observed for derivatives exposures that are off-the-balance-sheet. BHC-owned banks recorded an average ratio of outstanding derivatives (notional amounts of derivative contracts such as futures, forwards, options, and swaps and credit derivatives including credit default swaps, total return swaps and credit options) of 279 percent of assets prior to the crisis compared to an average of 3 percent for all banks. It is, however, difficult to establish the "credit equivalent" of these positions. For example, if one assumes an average conversion factor of 4.5 percent of the notional amount (the average of the Basel conversion factors applied to interest, FX and equity contracts), the credit equivalent of these exposures would be 13 percent of assets. Finally it should be noted that nontraditional and diversified banks recorded higher derivative ratios than the industry (12-13 percent of assets).
Lastly, we compare a number of risk indicators including the Z-score and the volatility of profits. The Zscore -defined by the ratio of the sum of the average return on assets and equity ratio over the volatility of the return on assets -measures the number of standard deviations that profits would have to fall to push a bank into insolvency. As such higher ratios are an indication of lower risks, i.e. a higher distance to default. The pre-and post-crisis averages suggest that traditional and diversified banks have been less risky than their non-traditional and more concentrated peers. Only in the case of BHCowned banks and the other banks, we find that BHC-owned banks first appeared less risky prior to the crisis, but then -once the crisis started -the pattern reverses which could be related to the important off-balance-sheet exposures discussed above. In terms of income volatility, it appears that more concentrated and BHC-owned banks have been hardest hit by the crisis.
Econometric strategy
In this section we examine econometrically the relationship between banks' business model and bank performance. Based on the portfolio choice theory and the empirical investigation of Stiroh and Rumble (2006), we measure bank performance in terms of the observed return and risk of a bank's asset portfolio -defined by the return on assets (ROA) and its volatility. While the return on assets is calculated directly from the financial reports as the ratio of annualized net income over total assets, we calculate its volatility over a bank's lifetime or over four quarterly observations depending on the econometric approach.
It could be argued that the unconditional volatility of profits is not an appropriate measure of a bank's riskiness, because financial markets allow investors to diversify and hedge idiosyncratic risks. While this criticism has to be taken seriously, it should be noted that such considerations only hold in an idealized world that does not take into account the presence of market imperfections in the banking industry such as agency problems or asymmetric information. Moreover, bank profits and their volatility are important indicators that are used by regulators, managers and shareholders to assess the performance and soundness of financial institutions. One could of course examine equity market returns and their implied volatility with the advantage that these performance indicators are forwardlooking, but with the caveat of limiting the sample to a much smaller sample of publicly-traded banks (Stiroh, 2006) . Figure 3 shows the average risk-return profile across small, medium-sized and large banks. Over the period 1995-2012, the average bank generated an annual return of 0.72 percent of assets with a standard deviation of 0.70 percent. The relation between return and risk is positive in the case of small banks, while it is negative in the case of medium-sized banks -implying that higher risks are not necessarily compensated by higher returns. The latter finding is similar to Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who find a negative correlation between the average profit ratio and its volatility for the period 1997-2002, which they interpret as evidence of the presence of negative shocks that lower both average profits and increase volatility.
Intuitively we can think that, if a bank invests in a traditional loan portfolio L and a non-traditional trading portfolio T, then the expected portfolio return, E(R P ), and its variance, V(R P ), are given by:
where x represents a bank's loan portfolio share in total assets and COV(R L ,R T ) is the covariance of the two individual portfolio returns. If a bank invests in a trading portfolio with a higher and more volatile return compared to the loan portfolio, E(R T )> E(R L ) and V(R T )> V(R L ), then a bank's performance indicators will be affected in three ways: (i) it will increase the expected return of the overall portfolio;
(ii) it will directly increase the overall variance through the variance term; and (iii) it will indirectly affect the overall variance through the covariance term depending on the sign and magnitude of the covariance. If we knew the expected returns of each individual bank activity and their variance-covariance matrix, then we could determine the optimal mix of bank activities, x*, depending on banks' risk preferences.
The optimal shares would be a function of the variance and covariance terms. With our data in hand,
however, it is difficult to measure the returns and volatilities of each type of activity, because they involve in many cases the use of services and intangible assets that are not directly visible on the balance sheet. Nevertheless, we can investigate the impact of a broader set of activities on overall bank returns and risks -including our measures for universal and non-traditional banks. Moreover, we provide in the final section a numerical evaluation of the optimal mix of banking activities using a simple back-of-the-envelop-calculation. dummy for stand-alone banks and a dummy for banks that are owned by bank holding companies which own non-bank subsidiaries.
The regressions are estimated by means of a cross-sectional and a fully-fledged time-varying panel setting. The cross-sectional analysis based on bank-specific averages over their lifetime (as shown in Figure 3 ) has the advantage that most random variations in income shares and diversification are likely to average out and that the results can be interpreted in terms of banks' long-term strategy (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006) . The identification of the relationship between bank performance and banks' activity diversification comes in this case entirely through the variation across banks. It does, however, not take into account the time variation related to changes in business strategies within banking groups. This approach obviously introduces the possibility of an omitted variable such as management skills (Campa and Kedia, 2002) . To address this issue, we estimate in addition fixed-effects regressions using yearly averages for the four quarterly observations of a given year. The potential drawback is, however, that the year-to-year variation within banks is less likely to capture a bank's long-term strategy and that it is more likely to be affected by unexpected random shocks which would weaken the link between expected and actual returns and the measurement accuracy of our measures on business orientation.
The econometric model is subject to a potential endogeneity problem. More specifically, the performance measures include net income in the nominator -which itself includes the different sources of income used in the definition of the right-hand side variables on banks' business orientation. This eventually could introduce an estimation bias, although the direction is ambiguous (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006) . For instance, while positive shocks to interest income would, ceteris paribus, reduce the non-traditional income share (by increasing the denominator) and increase profits, positive shocks to non-interest income would be associated with increases in the non-traditional income share (by increasing the nominator) and higher bank profits. To overcome this problem, we examine whether the results are robust to the use of predetermined information in the calculation of our measures on business orientation. In the cross-sectional analysis, we thus split the sample into two parts and use the first sub-sample to calculate banks' average non-traditional income shares and degree of diversification, while we use the second sub-sample to calculate our performance measures.
In the panel estimations on the other hand, we include the regressors with a lag of one year. The parsimonious set of control variables in vector X it is intended to account for other bank-level determinants of profitability and risks. Bank size is included to control for factors related to the scale of a bank's operations. While larger banks are more likely to benefit from economies of scale and geographic diversification, their risk choices could be distorted by too-big-fail considerations and implicit bailout guarantees (De Nicolo, 2001 ). Asset growth, capital, non-performing loans and brokered deposits are intended to control for a bank's risk appetite, and we expect that faster growing banks with lower levels of capital and higher levels of non-performing loans and brokered deposits are pursuing riskier strategies than the other banks. Banks active on the inter-bank market could be less profitable than other banks, while those financed with higher fractions of deposits (lower ratios of short-term borrowing) could be less risky than the other banks. Finally, it has been shown that standalone banks tend to be riskier than commercial banks that belong to a bank holding company (Ashcraft, 2008) , however, this might not be the case if a bank holding company owns non-bank subsidiaries (Geyfman and Yeager, 2009 ).
Summary statistics of the regression variables -expressed as yearly averages -are shown in Table 2 .
We cleaned the sample beforehand and excluded extreme observations with an annual return on assets of more than 20 percent (the 99 th percentile is 3.1) and less than -20 percent (the 1 st percentile is -3.7), annual asset growth of more than 100 percent (the 99 th percentile is 115 percent) and less than -100 percent (the 1 st percentile is -16), and those observations with an income volatility of more than 10 percent (the 99 th percentile is 2.6). Because we use the square of the non-traditional income share, we exclude in a final step those observations with negative non-traditional income shares (2 nd percentile) and those with a share of more than 100 percent (the 99 th percentile is 41). Finally, in all regressions the right-hand side variables are not in percentage form, as opposed to the return on assets and its volatility.
Regarding the results of the cross-sectional approach, estimated for bank averages over the period 2002-2012 and shown in Table 3 , it appears that many of the control variables affect significantly bank performance with similar signs and magnitudes across the different specifications. For example, other things being equal, larger banks do not have a significantly higher profitability compared to smaller
banks. It appears however that larger banks are significantly riskier -after controlling for other bankspecific characteristics and their business orientation -which could point to their more relaxed attitude towards risk. Faster growing banks and those with higher non-performing loans, capital ratios, interbank activities, and brokered deposits have all lower returns and higher average risks than banks with opposed characteristics. Moreover, it appears that stand-alone banks have been less profitable than banks that belong to a bank holding company, but they seem as well less risky in terms of income volatility. There no robust and significant differences across banks that are owned by bank holding companies with non-bank subsidiaries, which could be related to the correlation with the nontraditional income share, as discussed above.
The relationship between banks' business model and the two performance measures is in many cases significant. While diversification into interest and non-interest generating activities has not been associated with significantly higher returns, it appears that income volatility decreases with a higher degree of diversification. We find significant risk-reduction benefits for banks that have diversified their income sources. In terms of banks' expansion into the non-traditional spheres of banking, we find a robust and significant relationship with both returns and risks. Bank profits appear to be negatively affected by the non-traditional income share with an increasing marginal effect depending on the degree of non-traditional business orientation. To be more precise, the marginal effect turns positive in specification 3 for banks with a non-traditional income share of more than 14 percent ( Based on specification 3 shown in Table 3 , we plot in Figure 4 the risk-return impacts as a function of the degree of income diversification and the non-traditional income share, assuming that the other variables in the regression are at their respective means. The risk-return implications of a higher degree of income diversification are quite different: while bank returns are not significantly affected, risks decrease significantly with an increasing marginal effect.
Relative to a bank with a very low degree of income diversification (5 th percentile) which has an income volatility of 0.79 percent of assets, the average bank has a volatility of 0.68 percent. The risk-reduction benefit becomes increasingly important. In particular our results suggest that banks with a very high degree of diversification (95 th percentile) have a volatility of only 0.54 percent, meaning that risks are reduced by one third relative to a bank with a very low level of diversification.
Finally, we report the estimation results in which we used predetermined information for the calculation of the explanatory variables. More specifically, we calculate bank-specific averages over the period 2002-07 for all regressors, while the performance measures are averaged over the period 2008-12. While this estimation strategy has the advantage of alleviating the potential endogeneity bias discussed above, it comes at the cost that the out-of-sample averages only partially reflect their levels at the time when risks and returns realized. The estimations, shown in the fourth column of Table 3, indicate that our main conclusions are robust to the use of predetermined information. There is therefore evidence of important risk-reduction benefits across banks of income diversification, while overall risks increase with higher shares of non-traditional income without compensating banks by higher profits.
Next we discuss the results obtained from the fixed-effects estimations shown in Table 4 . This approach allows us to control for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across banks and to investigate the risk-return implications of business orientation within banks. Technically this means that we replace the long-term averages over a bank's lifetime with yearly averages over four quarterly observations. While on the one hand this approach takes into account the time variation in the data, it is less likely to capture a bank's long-term strategy since year-to-year variations are more likely to be influenced by transitory random variations. As a precaution, we lag the regressors by one year to ensure that our results are not biased by potential endogeneity problems. The first specification in Table 4 shows for comparison the estimation results when using pooled OLS, while the second specification uses the fixed effects estimator. In specification (2*), we replace the unbiased estimator for the standard deviation of profits with the efficient estimator for small samples (Longford, 2010) . In the final specification, we interact the explanatory variables with a crisis dummy for 2007-09 to allow for possible changes in the relationships across normal and crisis periods.
The results suggest that fixed effects are more important in the regressions on bank returns, since the coefficients differ considerably across pooled OLS and the fixed effects estimator, while there are smaller differences in the volatility regressions. After controlling for unobserved time-invariant differences across banks, which could reflect permanent differences in management skills or banks' specialisation into particular industries, we find that a higher non-traditional income share -in the year before profits are realized -is followed by significantly higher returns. This stands in sharp contrast to the results obtained when using long-term averages. For instance, the return of the average bank with a non-traditional income share of 6 percent is by 0.17 percent of assets higher (2.52×NT= 2.52×0.06=0.16) compared to a bank that is fully concentrated on traditional banking businesses. The return improvement represents close to one fifth of the average annual return on assets (see Table 2 ).
As before, there are no significant effects on profitability associated with income diversification.
In terms of the implied bank risks, the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the cross- Finally we discuss the results of the final specification in Table 4 that allows for parameter shifts in the estimated relationships when the economy turns from good times into a crisis period. In the case of diversification, we find similar results compared to specification 2. Higher diversification does not affect bank returns, but it has strong risk-reduction benefits -independent of the stance of the economy. As before, we find that bank risks increase non-linearly with higher non-traditional income shares. This is the case during both normal times and the crisis period, as indicated by the insignificant interaction terms. It is the effect of non-traditional activities on bank returns that depends on the state of the economy. To be more precise, there is a return-increasing effect during normal times. For instance, the average bank has a return of 0.11 percent of assets higher than a purely traditional bank.
During the crisis, however, the marginal effect is decreasing as indicated by the significant and negative coefficient of the interaction between the square of the non-traditional income share and the crisis dummy. While the return effect is still positive for the average bank, it becomes negative at very high levels of non-traditional income shares (75 percent of operating income).
To summarize, the results of the within estimations appear to point into the same direction in terms of the risk assessment of banks' business model when compared to the cross-sectional analysis. Bank risks decrease with income diversification and increase with higher non-traditional income shares. They differ, however, in the conclusion about the return implications of non-traditional activities. While there is no evidence of return improving effects across banks, it appears that -within banks -higher risks associated with non-traditional activities are partially compensated by higher returns. This compensation decreases, however, during crisis periods. There are several potential explanations for the differences in the cross-sectional and fixed-effects estimations. As pointed out by Stiroh and Rumble (2006) , an interpretation could be that only large differences in the business orientation across banks have significant effects on bank returns and risks that only show up over the long-term (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Schoar, 2002) . It could hereby be that an omitted variable, correlated with banks' business orientation, drives the results. An alternative explanation could be that long-term averages are better proxies for expected returns and risks compared to yearly averages. For instance, a bank might very well choose its business orientation as a function of expected long-term profits and risks, rather than to base its decision on annual returns and risks which are more likely to be affected by unexpected and transitory shocks. In the same sense, it could be that the yearly average of the nontraditional income share is only a poor measure of a bank's business orientation, especially in periods in which the income generated by a large non-traditional business line is close to zero. Over the long run, on the other hand, such variations should average out, and as such the long-run average of the non-traditional income share is more likely to represent the targeted level.
Robustness tests
This section performs some robustness checks with regards to both the performance indicators and measures on banks' business model. In a first step, we replace in the cross-sectional estimations the return on assets by the return on equity. Arguably bank managers might have targeted the income ratio over equity rather than the return on assets, as would be the case if a bank manager's preferences coincide with those of shareholders (e.g. they are equity holders). Moreover, it is relatively common that salary bonuses are linked to the return on equity. The estimation results are shown in specification 2 of Table 5 and visualized in Figure 5 . It appears that our main conclusions are reinforced: non-traditional activities are associated with lower returns and higher risks, while income diversification leads to risk-reductions. We reach, however, different results with respect to the implied returns associated with higher diversification: while income diversification has not been associated with a significantly higher return on assets, it increases the return on equity. In the second step, we exclude the variable on bank size because it could introduce an estimation bias linked to colinearity. To be more precise, there is evidence that the size of an institution is positively correlated with the non-traditional income share (Figure 2) . The results presented in the third specification of Table 5 are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those obtained before. Next we examine the effect on bank performance of a diversification measure based on asset rather than income categories. More specifically, we calculate a Herfindhal-Hirschmann index applied to seven broad asset categories: liquid assets (sum of cash, federal funds sold and trading assets), security investments, mortgages, agricultural loans, commercial & industrial loans, consumer loans and other assets. As can be seen in specification 4 of Table 5 , there are significant risk-reduction benefits of a diversified balance sheet, however, these have to counterweight against a negative effect on bank returns.
In the final step, we decompose banks' non-traditional income share into its individual components to gauge which activities in particular are driving the results. Table 6 shows the estimation results on the decomposition of non-traditional income into its individual components. 9 Hereby we concentrated the analysis on the long-term differences across banks. In specification (1), we replace the non-traditional income share by its 10 components keeping the other explanatory variables. The results point to significant revenue synergies in the case of insurance activities (underwriting and sale), servicing fees 10 , and the residual category "other non-interest income". Moreover, there appear to be risk-reduction benefits associated with fee-based income from insurance activities and securities brokerage, while overall risks increase with income generated by servicing fees, securitization and the category "other non-interest income". The findings are in line with DeYoung and Torna (2014).
Finally we decompose the residual category "other non-interest income" into its major components. 10 Servicing fees include income from servicing mortgages, credit cards and other financial assets held by other parties.
11 Banks are required to specify in the appendix of the call reports, in a couple of words, the nature and amount of any other non-interest income that exceeds $25,000 or 3 percent of other non-interest income. On average, the highest shares in other non-interest income have been observed for the categories that include the keywords debit card, merchant income, mortgage origination and broker fees, operating leases, intercompany administration fees, and affiliate income.
The optimal mix of bank activities: A back-of-the-envelope calculation
From a portfolio choice point of view, a bank can be interpreted as an agent who manages a portfolio of various types of assets which have different risk-return characteristics. Accordingly, a bank's optimal choice can be assessed within the portfolio choice theory developed by Markowitz (1952) . A difficulty that arises however is, that the risk-return characteristics of particular activities are hard to measure, because certain income-generating activities cannot be matched with the corresponding balance sheet positions or the resources that have been employed into that activity. More specifically, while it is relatively straightforward to obtain information on the income earned from an activity (the nominator of the return), it is much more difficult to infer the invested amount (the denominator).
For most traditional banking activities, the actual return can be calculated directly from the income statement and the balance sheet. For instance, the income statement provides information on the interest income generated by the stock of outstanding loans whereby the stock of loans is reported in the balance sheet. Similarly, one can match the interest income generated by investments into securities or trading assets with the corresponding balance sheet positions. The resources invested into Fee-for-Service activities, on the other hand, cannot be directly inferred from the financial accounts without further assumptions, as they involve in many cases contingent off-balance sheet positions or intangible assets such as human capital and non-financial assets like information technology (Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Stiroh, 2006) . Nevertheless, we can roughly approximate the invested amount using a back-of-the-envelope approach.
More specifically we consider six broad income-generating activities: costumer lending, inter-bank lending, investments in securities and trading assets, traditional non-interest activities (fiduciary and payment & deposit account services), insurance activities (underwriting and sale), and non-traditional non-interest activities (securities brokerage, investment banking, trading and securitization). The returns on the interest-generating activities are calculated as follows: (i) for costumer lending we use the ratio of interest income on loans divided by total costumer loans; (ii) for inter-bank lending we use the ratio of interest income on federal funds sold over federal funds sold; and (iii) for investments in securities and trading assets we use the ratio of the sum of interest and dividend income from securities and trading assets over the sum of securities (available-for-sale and held-to-maturity) and trading assets.
As for the calculation of the return on non-interest income generating activities, we have to impose further assumptions. Because fiduciary and payment & deposit account services tend to be offered to most of a bank's retail customers, who themselves also tend to be bank borrowers, we calculate in a first step the ratio of income generated by these activities over the interest income generated by loans, and then we proxy the invested amount into these activities ("balance sheet equivalent") by the total of costumer loans multiplied by this ratio. A similar procedure is applied to insurance income and income related to securitization. As for the remaining categories (brokerage, trading and investment banking),
we calculate the ratio of the income generated by each activity over the income generated by securities (for brokerage and investment banking) or over the income generated by trading assets (for trading), and then, we proxy the balance sheet equivalent for these activities by the income ratios multiplied by securities and trading assets, respectively.
The procedure is applied to large and small banks separately, since large banks are much more involved in non-interest generating activities compared to small banks, and as such we expect that our proxies for the invested amounts vary according to bank size. The average return and risk of each activity for the post-crisis period of 2010-12 is represented across large and small banks in Figure 5 . From a risk-return perspective, it becomes apparent that the traditional activities (customer lending, investments in securities and trading assets, fiduciary and payment & deposit account services) tend to outperform insurance, non-traditional and inter-bank activities. For instance, customer lending generated in the considered period an average annual gross return of close to 6 percent of total customer lending with a standard deviation between 2 and 3 percent. For both large and small banks, customer lending and traditional non-interest activities have been associated with relatively high returns and reasonable risks in the post-crisis period. The other activities seem either too risky or they do not generate high returns. However, this does not necessarily imply that these activities should not be included in a bank's portfolio -rather -this depends on the covariance terms.
Using the standard portfolio choice theory, we thus calculate the risk-minimizing mix of bank activities.
The overall risk of the banks' portfolios can be minimized as follows: where is the variance-covariance matrix of the individual returns, x i the proportion invested in activity i, and x i 0 the no-short-selling constraint.
As can be seen in Figure 5 , the minimum variance portfolio (MVP) for large banks is very close to the risk-return profile of a portfolio that is concentrated on costumer lending, while in the case of small banks there seem to be important diversification benefits. For large banks, the minimum variance portfolio involves investing 70% in customer lending, 16% in securities and trading assets, 5.9% in inter-bank lending, 6.2% in traditional non-interest activities, 0.4% in insurance activities and 1.3% in non-traditional activities. For small banks, the lowest risks are achieved when investing 34% in customer lending, 16% in securities and trading assets, 33% in inter-bank lending, 5.1% in traditional non-interest activities, 2.5% in insurance and 9.1% in non-traditional activities.
Our back-of-the-envelope calculation is, of course, subject to some potential drawbacks, but nevertheless, it allows us to sketch the risk-return trade-off faced by banks. First of all, it represents only an imperfect and recent snapshot of the risk-return characteristics of bank activities, but data limitations and the financial turmoil do not allow us to extend the analysis over a longer time horizon. 13 And second, there is certainly some measurement error involved in our identification of the returns generated by fee-based income activities. Our analysis, however, indicates that there is scope for more research of this type and that regulators could improve on banks' reporting requirements on the balance sheet equivalents of income generating activities and their public dissemination.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the relationship between banks' income diversification, expansion into non-traditional activities and bank returns and risks for the US banking system over the period Note: (1) "Derivatives" is the sum of the gross notional amount of derivative contracts (future, forward, options, swaps) and credit derivatives (credit default swaps, total return swaps, credit options, other credit derivatives). Note: The variables are bank-specific yearly averages over quarterly observations. Year fixed effects are included but not reported. All regressors are lagged by one year (except for the dummy variable). In specification (2*), the unbiased estimator of the standard error is replaced by the efficient estimator for small samples (Longford, 2010) . "C" denotes a crisis dummy which is equal to one during 2007-09. Robust standard errors that are clustered at the bank-level are reported. (***,**,*) indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Table 3 are reported in specification (1). In specification (2), the estimations are done for return on equity instead of return on assets. In specification (4), diversification refers to an HHI index applied to asset categories. Robust standard errors are reported. ***,**,* indicate significance on the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. Table 3 , are included but not reported. The words shown in italic indicate the keywords of our search process.
